

COUNTERING ELECTORAL DISINFORMATION

Training Module For Media

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Training Agenda

The training is planned for two days over approximately 13 hours, to be completed in fifteen sessions. The following training agenda will be followed.

Day 1

Session No	Session Title	Allocated Time
Session 1	unpacking Information Manipulation	60 Minutes
Session 2	The Many Faces of Information Manipulation	60 Minutes
Session 3	Call Them Out	40 Minutes
Session 4	The Incredible Power of Information Manipulation	60 Minutes
Session 5	Unveiling The Actors and Their Tools	75 Minutes
Session 6	GenAi: Your New Personal Assistant	45 Minutes
Session 7	Finding a Response	45 Minutes

Day 2

Session No	Session Title	Allocated Time
Session 8	Who's Election is it Anyway	45 Minutes
Session 9	The Long Road to the Ballot Box	45 Minutes
Session 10	The Law	40 Minutes
Session 11	Identifying the Challenge	30 Minutes
Session 12	Arming Yourself Against Information Manipulation	60 Minutes
Session 13	Images - the Hero Ingredient of Information Manipulation	45 Minutes
Session 14	The Check Box	60 Minutes
Session 15	Wrap Up	30 Min



Program Overview:

This curriculum has been designed with the view to increase the ability of media practitioners, election and human rights monitors and the youth to respond to election-related information manipulation by identifying the various types accurately and quickly through an election- specific curriculum, CSO-focused capacity building activities and an improved distribution network.

Methodology

The curriculum and training have been designed to provide participants with a conceptual understanding of information manipulation in general and specifically in the context of the Pakistan General Elections. In order to do this, it is necessary for them to be familiar with the related law and procedures governing the elections, and to be able to identify the types of electoral information manipulation that occurs at the various stages of the election cycle. This will be done through skill-based learning by providing fact-checking tools and analysing the work of fact-checking organizations. The information in the curriculum is supplemented with exercises during the training and guest speaker sessions, to situate the learning in a hands-on and relevant manner.



Introduction and Objectives

Training Overview

Welcome participants. Conduct a round of introductions. Provide relevant material for the training. Provide a programme overview and brief the participants about the objectives of the training for the next two days.

Game – Go Viral

Game: Begin with Go Viral Game as a group activity
<https://www.goviralgame.com/en>

Alright. Your turn to weigh in. Remember: outrage means engagement. Choose three words to show people what you really think about #ToiletPaperVsNature 🧻.

Mild

Alarming

Potentially concerning

Terrifying

HUGELY concerning

The game allows participation and a visual depiction of the stages of information manipulation and cycle of engagement. Discuss with participants what propelled their responses and the outcomes it led to in the game.

Objective:

To familiarize and engage participants with the concept of information manipulation



Methodologies:


Prior to the training, participants will be requested to share a half-page account of an event that each participant considers to be an example of electoral information manipulation

Participants' answers will be discussed with the trainer moderating the discussion



Resources:

Participant responses, Powerpoint presentation and handouts



Objective:

Participants should understand how to distinguish between the various types of information manipulation, methods used to propel it and the impact it has



Methodologies:



Participants will work with the trainer to piece together an information-driven story, with a view to understanding that in the absence of the full picture, how difficult it is to spot information manipulation as it is taking shape over a period of time


Discuss extracts reproduced below from the IRI playbook for familiarize participants with the concepts

Use the CIMA Report on Digital Disinformation around the Elections to discuss the various types of information manipulation

Through the local examples provided, discuss how each category is distinct from the other

Resources:

Powerpoint presentation and handouts



What are the types of Information Manipulation

1

Misinformation is false, inaccurate or misleading information, regardless of the intent to deceive.

2

Disinformation is the deliberate creation, distribution and/ or amplification of false, inaccurate or misleading information intended to deceive.

3

Malinformation takes truthful or factual information and weaponizes it for persuasion.

For example, this might include content that was released as part of a hack-and-leak operation, where private messages are shared publicly with the goal of undermining an adversary.

4

Propaganda is information designed to promote a political goal, action or outcome. Propaganda often involves disinformation, but can also make use of facts, stolen information or half-truths to sway individuals. It often makes emotional appeals, rather than focusing on rational thoughts or arguments. Propaganda can be pushed by other actors, but in this report, we focus specifically on state-sponsored propaganda.

5

Hate speech is the use of discriminatory language with reference to a person or group on the basis of identity, including an individual's religion, ethnicity, nationality, ability, gender or sexual orientation. Hate speech is often a part of broader information manipulation efforts. It is particularly present in election contexts where the goal of the information manipulation is to polarize political discourse and/or suppress the political participation of a particular group.




What does Information Manipulation look like?

Using the CIMA Report on Digital Disinformation around the Elections, discuss the different categories of information manipulation.




Fabricated content



Imposter content



Satire & Parody



Misleading content






False Connection



Manipulated content




False Context





Satire or Parody - No intention to cause harm but has potential to fool

“Sethi: TTP have assured me they will only attack police guarding HBL PSL.”



Imposter Content - When genuine sources are impersonated

“Fact check: Indian news outlet duped by fake twitter account of Pakistan health ministry.”



Fabricated Content - New content is 100% false, designed to deceive and cause harm


“Genuine clip of Imran Khan in Jail.”



Manipulated Content - When genuine information or imagery is manipulated to deceive

“Digitally manipulated picture of Imran Khan with beard emerges amid reports of poor jail facilities.”





Misleading Content - Misleading use of information to frame an issue or individual

“Viral selfie of a caretaker PM was not taken during recent UNGA visit.”



False Connection - When headlines, visuals and captions don't support the content

“CGI video passed of as amid Vegas alien reports.”



False Context - When genuine content is shared with false contextual information

“Did 50,000 Supporters of former PM Nawaz Sharif rally in Lahore when he returned from abroad and was arrested unfounded.”



Objective:

To understand who is involved in information manipulation and through the use of what tools and tactics they achieve this



Methodologies:

Game: Harmony Square:

Use relevant portions reproduced below from the IRI playbook to build a conceptual understanding of threat actors and tactics

Flipchart activity:

Engage participants by asking them to apply the concepts explained in this section. On a flipchart, source answers by asking the following questions:

Who are threat actors in your environment?


What tactics are used to manipulate information?

Identify specific examples of information manipulation that fit some of the specific categories listed above



Resources:

Powerpoint presentation and handouts



Game: Harmony Square

<https://harmonysquare.game/en/play>



Harmony Square is obsessed with democracy. Its three political parties are bickering constantly, and the news ticker can't stop reporting on it. The perfect place for an influence campaign.



This game makes participants take on the role of disinformation actors to give them a taste of how it's done

Who are the Threat Actors?

In most election environments, a number of different actors will likely engage in information manipulation. To make things more complicated, while some of those actors may operate independently, others may operate in coordination, be at cross- purposes, or benefit from the general chaos and lack of trust in the information environment. Different actors have different goals for engaging in information manipulation. A political campaign will focus on winning an election; the influence industry and commercial public relations firms want to make money; a foreign adversary might try to influence the election outcome, advance national interests, or sow chaos; or an extremist group might focus on advancing their political cause. Here, we have outlined common threat actors involved in information manipulation campaigns. Though this list is not exhaustive, it provides a starting point for thinking about the relevant actors in your own country's context.

- **Political parties and campaigns use information manipulation to discredit the opposition, use false amplification to reach a wider audience or suggest that they have more public support than they do, or manipulate political discourse in a way that serves their campaign agenda. It is important to note that political campaigns can make use of information manipulation both outside of and during election cycles.**

- **Hate and other extremist groups use information manipulation to advance their social or political agenda, often by fomenting hate and political polarization; silencing, intimidating or otherwise disenfranchising target groups; and inciting violence. Their goals can include turning the majority electorate against a particular group, increasing support for extremist policies, and/or suppressing political participation.**



● **Commercial actors, composed of social media platforms, public relations companies or strategic communication firms, use information manipulation as part of a business model, working with other actors to spread disinformation for profit. The influence industry often works with political campaigns, governments or foreign states to support their particular goals.**



● **Foreign governments use information manipulation as a tool of statecraft and geopolitics. Information manipulation might be used to influence the outcome of an election in a strategically important country, advance the interests of the government or shape public perception of the state abroad. Information manipulation can be both covert (e.g., through the use of fake accounts) or overt (e.g., through state-backed media).**



● **Non-independent media with a specific political agenda or economic interest, or who are backed by a government or other political actor, may use information manipulation to influence public attitudes in line with the goals of their backers.**



● **Domestic governments use information manipulation to influence public attitudes and suppress the political participation or expression of certain users, such as activists, journalists or political opponents. Like foreign states, governments use both overt and covert information manipulation to achieve political goals, including the repression of human rights. Domestic governments can also more readily enact censorship as a form of information manipulation.**



How Information is Manipulated:

Information manipulation makes use of a variety of tactics to spread, amplify or target messages to different audiences on social media. Many of these tactics exploit the features of digital and social networking technologies to spread different kinds of content. While media manipulation is not new, digital tactics can change the scope, scale and precision of information manipulation in various ways. Here, we provide definitions for some of the key tactics that researchers, journalists, activists and platform companies have identified.

- **AI-generated technology** is used in information manipulation to create fake profiles or content. Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies, like Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN), use machine learning “neural networks” to create images or videos that look like real people but are completely fake. This includes “deepfake” videos, which use AI technologies to create realistic-looking videos that are entirely false.

- **Manipulated visual** content is used in information manipulation to photoshop images or edit videos. This can involve so-called “cheap fakes,” which do not use AI-generated technologies, but rather alter videos with a lower level of technical sophistication.

- **Search engine manipulation** uses tools from digital advertising—such as keyword placement—to exploit gaps in search results. These strategies attempt to place disinformation at the top of search engine queries, so that individuals looking for accurate information are more likely to come across disinformation.

- **Fake websites** are used to create the substance behind an influence manipulation campaign by creating “fake news” websites or content farms that publish large amounts of false, misleading or inaccurate stories, sometimes counterfeiting real news organizations.

- **Trolling** is the bullying or harassing of individuals to provoke an emotional reaction in the target. While anyone can be trolled online, certain communities experience trolling differently— and often more severely. This includes women, individuals with diverse gender identities, racial or ethnic minorities, or people of color.

- **Computational propaganda** involves the use of “bots” and other forms of automated technologies to amplify propaganda and other harmful content online. Bots are pieces of code designed to mimic human behavior by liking, sharing, retweeting or even commenting on posts. They can be used to falsely amplify certain kinds of content or accounts online.
- **Fake or “sock puppet”** accounts involve accounts, run by real people, who generate inorganic engagement. Like bots, fake or sock puppet accounts can like, share, retweet or comment on posts to falsely amplify certain kinds of content or accounts online. But rather than being automated, fake or sock puppet accounts are run by real people.
- **Hack-and-leak** operations involve hacking into private or sensitive information sources and strategically leaking information to the public in order to undermine the trust or integrity of a person or idea.
- **Account takeovers** involve hacking into the accounts of real people in order to impersonate them or spread mis/ disinformation to large audiences.
- **Advertising and microtargeting** involve using online advertising platforms to collect data about users and targeting them with persuasive messaging.
- **Censorship involves blocking**, redirecting or throttling access to certain kinds of information online.

Flip Chart Activity:

Engage participants by asking them to apply the concepts explained in this section. On a flipchart, source answers by asking the following questions:

- 1) **Who are threat actors in your environment?**
- 2) **What tactics are used to manipulate information?**

Identify specific examples of information manipulation that fit some of the specific categories listed above.

Objective:

Deep dive into the tools available to the actors behind information manipulation, and what makes it possible for them to work independently of an operator

Participants should be aware of local fact-checking organisations, the critical thinking skills required to assess information and tools at their disposal to verify information manipulation



Methodologies:

Follow up with a fact-check activity

Skill-building after dealing with the theoretical side of information manipulation. We will try and build a clear and precise discussion on which tool is best employed for what kind of an investigation



Resources:

Powerpoint presentation and handouts



Fact checking Tools:

- a) Google Image Search to determine the origin of photos or videos.
- b) TinEye Reverse Image Search to determine how long and how often an image has been available and how it has been edited.
- c) Google Fact Check Explorer to find existing fact- check results regarding a person, topic or issue.
- d) Amnesty International YouTube DataViewer to determine if a video or parts of a video have been previously uploaded online
- e) The Global Disinformation Index to find the probability of disinformation on a specific media outlet.
- f) CrowdTangle from Meta: a tool from Meta that makes it easier to follow, analyse, and report on what's happening with public content on social media
- g) Social Blade: a website that provides analytics, statistics and insights into the performance of social media accounts and channels eg YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, Twitter, Twitch etc
- h) Add-ons for archiving
- i) DownThemAll: Download bulk media automatically
- j) SingleFile: Alternative screen capture for HTML files
- k) Exif Viewer: Identify metadata embedded inside an image or photograph
- l) OneTab: Collapse or expand tabs into a single resource
- m) Wayback Machine: Search archived versions of the current website (both add ons and websites)

Fact-checking Exercise:

- 1) Provide an image, use Google Reverse Image search to check accuracy
- 2) Provide a link to a video that can be fact checked using Amnesty International YouTube DataViewer
- 3) Check the the Global Disinformation Index for a media outlet

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Tools for Identifying Information Manipulation

Disclaimer: These tools tend to be quite technical and are only being shared so participants are aware of the resources at their disposal

OSINT is the collection and analysis of information from public (open) sources. These resources can be used for tracking and identifying disinformation.



Bellingcat's Online Investigation Toolkit: (Resource List)

This easy-to-navigate Google Doc spreadsheet has different tabs for different tools for verifying information, such as image and video verification; social media content and accounts; phone numbers and closed messaging services; maps and location-based services; transport trackers; IP and website analysis; international companies; environment; tools for improving online security, privacy and data visualization; academic resources; and additional guidebooks.




Data Journalism's Verification Handbook for Disinformation and Media Manipulation: (Guide)

This handbook helps you conduct OSINT research into social media accounts, bot-detection and image manipulation. It also provides resources for conducting investigations on the web and across platforms, as well as some tips and tools for attribution.



The Beacon Project's Media Monitoring Handbook: (Guide)

This handbook helps you conduct data-driven analyses of disinformation narratives and their sources. The handbook is a good starting place for researchers interested in conducting media monitoring, but are not sure where to start, as well as those looking to ensure methodological best practices are being applied.



CrowdTangle: (Tool)

Facebook created CrowdTangle as a tool for identifying and monitoring trends on social media. The tool can track verified accounts, Pages and public Groups. The tool can also be used to monitor public accounts on Instagram and subreddit threads on the Reddit platform.

Collaborative Fact-Checking Efforts

While journalists are often the leading actors in fact-checking efforts, many of the most successful fact-checking initiatives have been the result of collaboration across stakeholder groups; CSOs, NGOs and even EMBs can complement journalists' efforts by acting as reliable sources of information and offering supplementary expertise. Below are examples of fact-checking collaborations that involve multiple democratic actors.



- **StopFake is a fact-checking organization founded by Ukrainian professors and students to identify and investigate fake information about events in Ukraine.**



- **Africa Check is Africa's first independent, non-profit organization covering Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa, analyzing important public statements and publishing fact-checking reports to guide public debate.⁸³**



- **Chequeado is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to the verification of public discourse and to countering mis/disinformation. Chequeado convenes all stakeholder groups in their efforts to combat mis/disinformation.**



- **The International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) is a unit of the Poynter Institute that convenes fact-checkers worldwide and that actively promotes best practices and exchanges in this field, in addition to providing training and fellowships.⁸⁵**



- **Verificado is a collaborative fact-checking platform that aims to combat disinformation and fake news surrounding Mexican elections, as well as verify reports on the electoral process (see the Mexico Case Study in Appendix A on page 49 for additional details).⁸⁶**

- **Third-party fact-checkers** have partnered with Facebook to review and rate the accuracy of Facebook articles and posts. In countries such as Colombia, Indonesia, and Ukraine, as well as various members of the EU, Facebook has commissioned groups—through what is described as “a thorough and rigorous application process” established by the IFCN—to become trusted fact-checkers who vet content, provide input into the algorithms that define the News Feed, and downgrade and flag content that is identified as false.⁸⁷

Global fact-checking resources may also be useful, such as Claim Buster and AP Fact Check, among others.



1	Associated Press (AP)	https://apnews.com/ap-fact-check
2	Agence France Press (AFP)	https://factcheck.afp.com/
3	Claim Buster	https://idir.uta.edu/claimbuster/
4	Soch	https://www.sochfactcheck.com/
5	Geo Fact Check	https://www.geo.tv/writer/geo-fact-check
6	Hum Fact Check	https://humnews.pk/category/fact-check/

Objective:

To help participants understand the relationship between political power and legal obligations. Participants should familiarize themselves with the local context in which information disinformation takes place, how it has been addressed and rectified




Methodologies:

Exploring the relationship between Constitutional provisions, the Election Act and election rules with a view to understanding the issue of precedence. Information is broken down in an FAQ format and into tables to enable an easy grasp of the laws and procedures.



Resources:

Powerpoint presentation and handouts



The Law

Who conducts the Elections?

Article 218 (Constitution of Pakistan): It is the duty of the Election Commission to organize and conduct the election and make arrangements to ensure that the election is conducted honestly, justly, fairly and in accordance with law, keeping a check on corrupt practices.

When are Elections supposed to be held?

Article 224 (Constitution of Pakistan): General election to the National Assembly or a Provincial Assembly shall be held within a period of sixty days immediately following the day on which the term of the Assembly is due to expire. When the National Assembly or a Provincial Assembly is dissolved, a general election to the Assembly shall be held within a period of ninety days after the dissolution, and the results of the election shall be declared not later than fourteen days after the conclusion of the polls.

The Law

Who can be a candidate? How can they file their nomination?

Section 2(vii) of Election Act, 2017, defines a candidate as a person proposed and seconded as a candidate for, or seeking, election as a Member. To be a member it is necessary that he fulfils the qualifications specified in Article 62 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 and is not subject to any of the disqualifications specified in Article 63 of the Constitution.

Procedure:

Section 60 of the Election Act 2017 describes the procedure for filing of nomination by the candidate. For this purpose, any voter of a constituency may propose the name of any qualified person to be a candidate for Member for that constituency.

Furthermore, every nomination shall be made by a separate nomination paper on Form A signed both by the proposer, the seconder and the candidate. This nomination shall be delivered to the Returning Officer by the candidate or his proposer or seconder.

What is the voting procedure?

The procedure of voting is provided under Section 84 of the Elections Act. As per this section where a voter presents himself at the polling station to vote, the Presiding Officer shall issue a ballot paper only after the identification of the voter by checking his CNIC.

Before a ballot paper is issued to a voter, the number and name of the voter as entered in the electoral roll shall be called out and he shall be required to receive a personal mark, made with indelible ink, on any finger or thumb of either hand as indicated by the Commission.

On receiving the ballot paper, the voter shall forthwith proceed to the place reserved for marking the ballot paper and put the prescribed mark on the ballot paper at any place within the space containing the name and symbol of the contesting candidate for whom he wishes to vote; and after he has so marked the ballot paper, fold and insert it in the ballot box. The voter shall vote without undue delay and shall leave the polling station immediately after he has inserted his ballot paper in the ballot box.

In case a voter has spoiled a ballot paper then Section 87 provides that the voter is bound to return the same to the presiding officer who shall provide another ballot paper to the voter so that he may cast his vote.

Now, it is the duty of the Presiding Officer to cancel such returned ballot paper and make a note of it before placing it in a separate packet bearing the label "Spoilt Ballot Papers".

What is the responsibility of a voter?

As per section 60 of the Elections Act no voter shall subscribe to more than one nomination paper either as proposer or seconder.

The voter is responsible for producing his CNIC at the polling station as per the requirements of section 84. The voter is also required to comply with the directions of the presiding officer. A voter on receiving the ballot paper shall forthwith proceed to the place reserved for marking the ballot paper and then put the prescribed mark on the ballot paper at any place within the space containing the name and symbol of the contesting candidate for whom he wishes to vote; and after he has so marked the ballot paper, fold and insert it in the ballot box.

Moreover, the voter shall vote without undue delay and shall leave the polling station immediately after he has inserted his ballot paper in the ballot box.

How is law and order maintained during an election?

It is the duty of law enforcement agencies to maintain law and order during the elections.

More specifically section 54(3) of the Elections Act, makes the Presiding Officer responsible for maintaining order at the polling station and all officials posted at a polling station including officials of law enforcing agencies shall render their fullest cooperation to the Presiding Officer for maintenance of order and for ensuring uninterrupted voting at the polling station.

As per section 83 of the Act, a person is liable to be arrested without a warrant by a Police Officer if he misconducts himself at a polling station or fails to obey any lawful orders of the Presiding Officer.

Moreover, officials of the law enforcement agencies shall be posted for security duties outside the polling station but in an emergency may be called inside by the Presiding Officer to restore order and peaceful polling.

ACTOR TABLE

THE WHO'S WHO IN PAKISTAN GENERAL ELECTION

Election Commission of Pakistan

What is the role and mandate of the ECP under the constitution and law?

The Election Commission organises and conducts the election, ensuring that the process is honest, just, fair, according to the law, keeping a check on corrupt practices.

What is the ECP empowered to do?

The ECP is duty bound to hold elections for the National Assembly, the provincial assemblies, local governments and the Senate.

The ECP prepares electoral rolls and revises them annually.

The ECP appoints election tribunals to settle election-related disputes.

The commission has power to declare a poll null and void on grave illegalities or violation of law as per section 9 of the Election Act 2017. Appeals can be made to the Supreme Court.

What instructions is the ECP empowered to give political parties, the executive and other actors regarding the conduct of elections?

Section 4 of the Election Act, 2017 gives the commission the authority to issue necessary directions for the performance of its functions and duties.

These directions are enforceable across Pakistan.

Section 4 of the Election Act 2017, gives the ECP the powers of high court, including contempt of court if its directives are not complied with.

The ECP has the power to control the transfer of election officials during the elections and take disciplinary action against misconduct.

What happens if the ECP's decisions are not followed?

As per Article 220 of the constitution, all executive authorities at the federal and provincial levels are bound to assist the Election Commission in the discharge of his functions.

If the directions of the commission are not complied with than it has the powers to punish any person for contempt of court with powers similar to a high court.

<p>Election Officials</p>	<p>The officials of the election are appointed by the Election Commission at least four months before the general elections, as provided in the Action Plan in section 9 of the Elections Act, 2017. Section 54 of the Act provides the duties of the election officials.</p> <p>The Returning Officer oversees the conduct of the poll in a specified jurisdiction, including scrutinising the candidates’ nomination papers, appointing polling staff, consolidating results and dispatching these to the ECP.</p> <p>The Presiding Officer reports to the Returning Officer, and responsibilities include maintaining law and order at the assigned polling station, efficient polling day management, and handing over signed copies of the polling station count, ballot papers account and other election material to the Returning Officer.</p> <p>The Presiding Officer has the powers of a magistrate.</p>
<p>Judiciary</p>	<p>According to section 126 of the Act, the commission has the same powers as a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to dispose of an appeal.</p> <p>The decisions of the commission can be appealed.</p> <p>According to the provisions of the act and in particular Section 9, any person who disagrees with the result has thirty days to file an appeal in the Supreme Court.</p>
<p>Political Parties</p>	<p>What is the eligibility criteria for a political party/candidate to contest the elections?</p> <p>To contest elections, the political party needs to have a minimum of 2,000 members and a PKR 200,000 enlistment fee, according to sections 201 and 202 of the Elections Act 2017.</p> <p>What rules are laid down in law regarding the conduct of political parties and candidates for the elections?</p> <p>The political parties are bound to submit annual financial statements and lists of donors who have donated more than PKR 100,000 to the party, according to sections 2010 and 211.</p> <p>The political parties will elect office-bearers at the federal, provincial and local level every five years, according to section 208 (1).</p>

<p>Political Parties</p>	<p>What codes are political parties and their candidates bound by e.g. campaigning, others?</p> <p>Political parties are not allowed to run a publicity campaign in print and electronic media at the cost of the public exchequer. They are also expected to follow the code prescribed by the commission regarding the size of posters, handbill or pamphlet, etc as given in section 180 of Election Act, 2017.</p>
<p>Executives</p>	<p>What is the role of the executive in the conduct of the elections?</p> <p>As per Article 120 of the Constitution, all executive authorities in the Federation and in the provinces are supposed to assist the Commissioner and the Election Commission.</p> <p>What kind of assistance can the ECP ask of executive authorities during an election?</p> <p>The federal, or, the provincial government, is bound to give the Commission the number of constituencies to be delimited, details of administrative and revenue units, census data and maps drawn to scale during the delimitation exercise conducted by the Commission.</p>
<p>Media/Social Media</p>	<p>What codes are applicable to the media/social media? Are they binding? Under which law, rule, procedure are these laid down?</p> <p>Section 233 of the Election Act makes it the duty of commission to frame a Code of Conduct for security personnel, media and election observers and it is the duty of these stakeholders to abide by the formulated code of conduct. The Commission is also bound to publish a Code of Conduct in the official Gazette and on its website.</p> <p>In light of Section 182 of the Elections Act 2017, any media person on print, electronic and social media will not promote or air the election campaign of any candidate or political party forty-eight hours before the polling day.</p>

Election Forms

Election Form	What is it for	Timeline
Form 26	Appointment orders of polling staff	After the approval of the District Returning Officer, the presiding Officer shall issue appointment orders to the Presiding Officer, Assistant Presiding Officers and Polling Officers in respect of each polling station on Form-26.
Form 28	List of polling stations for a constituency along with official notification of any changes made under Section 59(B)	Within one week after appointment of Returning Officers, the District Election Commissioner shall provide a list of proposed polling stations in Form-28.
Form 33	List of contesting candidates	As per rule 56(1) of the Elections Rules, 2017, the publishing of list of validly nominated candidates.
Form 45	Result of the count at the polling station	After the polling hours are over, the Commission generates Form-45 as provided under rule 84C of the Election Rules.
Form 46	Ballot paper account	Immediately after count of votes as per the requirement of section 90(11) of the Act and Rules.
Form 47	Provisional Consolidated Statement of the results of the account for constituency	Results of the count received by RO from Presiding Officers as provided under rule 84.
Form 49	Final consolidated result	As provided in rule 88. The commission on receipt of the Final Consolidated Result from the Returning Officer

Objective:

Participants should familiarise themselves with the local context in which information disinformation takes place, how it has been addressed and rectified. Participants should be able to apply the knowledge they have acquired and tools they have tested, to situations which are likely to occur. The aim of this simulation is to develop their skills to identify, apply and respond to situations in real-time as they may arise.





Methodologies:

Simulation activity to identify and build resilience against electoral disinformation

Resources:

Powerpoint presentation and handouts





Election Day Information Manipulation

A video began circulating on Facebook on the day of the 2018 elections titled “**Rigging by Woman Caught on Camera in Pakistan General Election 2018.**” It quickly gained more than 150,000 views in the span of four days. However, AFP fact-checkers showed that the video was a 2008 case of election rigging in Karachi.

<https://factcheck.afp.com/no-viral-video-does-not-show-cheating-pakistans-national-election>

Candidate Nomination & Campaign

Misinformation/Disinformation

Example: Manipulated Images & videos.

Manipulated Images & videos of political leaders and candidates were shared online to portray them in a negative or compromising light. These included fabricated speeches, photoshopped images and selectively edited videos.



Voting

Misinformation/Disinformation

Example: Voter Stamp Rumors.

There were rumors on social media claiming that some polling stations had run out of ink for the stamp used to mark voters' thumbs. This led to concern that voters would be unable to cast their ballots. However, these reports were largely unsubstantiated and were later debunked by election officials



Final Reports Audit

Misinformation/Disinformation


Example: Fake Election Results

False election results were circulated on social media, claiming to be official data from the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). These fake results were designed to create confusion and doubt the accuracy of the actual election results.



Election Day Information Manipulation

“A video began circulating on Facebook on the day of the 2018 elections titled “Rigging by Woman Caught on Camera in Pakistan General Election 2018.” It quickly gained more than 150,000 views in the span of four days. However, AFP fact-checkers showed that the video was a 2008 case of election rigging in Karachi.”



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During the 2018 general elections in Pakistan, there were several instances of information manipulation on election day. These false reports were often circulated on social media and aimed to create confusion and doubt about the electoral process. Here are some examples:



1. ****Voter Stamp Rumors****: There were rumors on social media claiming that some polling stations had run out of ink for the stamp used to mark voters' thumbs. This led to concerns that voters would be unable to cast their ballots. However, these reports were largely unsubstantiated and were later debunked by election officials.



2. ****Voting Machines Malfunction****: False reports circulated that electronic voting machines (EVMs) were malfunctioning at various polling stations, leading to delays and chaos. While there were some technical issues reported, these were blown out of proportion in some cases.




3. ****Bogus Reports of Violence****: There were fake reports of violent clashes at polling stations, with some claiming that polling staff had been attacked and ballot boxes destroyed. Such reports were often accompanied by manipulated images and videos.



4. ****Allegations of Voter Suppression****: Misleading claims were made about voter suppression, suggesting that certain groups were being denied the right to vote. These claims were often exaggerated or based on isolated incidents.




5. ****Rigging Allegations****: While legitimate concerns about election rigging existed, false reports of widespread rigging and ballot stuffing were circulated on social media, sometimes with fabricated evidence.



6. ****Fake Exit Polls****: Bogus exit polls were shared on social media platforms, claiming to predict election results accurately. These fake polls contributed to confusion and misinformation about the likely outcome of the election.

It's important to note that while some incidents and issues did occur during the 2018 elections in Pakistan, false reports and rumours amplified the perceived problems and contributed to a sense of uncertainty and distrust in the electoral process. Election authorities and fact-checking organizations worked to address and debunk these false claims to maintain the integrity of the electoral process.



Information Manipulation During the Election Cycle - Simulation

Divide participants into groups. Provide a different local case study to each group. Using the section “Identifying, Responding to and Building Resilience against Information Manipulation” in the playbook, ask them to do the following. Each group then presents.

Identify

Whats is the claim	
How viral is the claim (What is its extent, reach and spread)?	
What is the nature of the claim? (Who Shared it?)	

Respond

How will you find the facts

What tool will you use

How will you correct the record

Build Resilience

How will you build resilience?

**Plan a public awareness
campaign**

**What can you do to increase
media and digital literacy?**

